INTRODUCTION
During the last few years, when the representatives of China and the United States To fill this literature gap, this paper investigates the changing competitive landscape of foreign-financed manufacturing firms and its implications for regional development in Guangdong province of southern China ahead of WTO accession. The discussion focuses on the (combined) effects of the WTO accession treaties and the (new) Chinese government policies enforced ahead of accession on the competitiveness of foreign-financed manufacturing firms.
Economic relationships, such as sub-contracting, between foreign-financed firms and privately-funded firms, and the policy implications of the development of private entrepreneurship and the SOE reform on the economic development of southern China will be highlighted. 3 Although it is a very significant issue, the competitiveness of foreign-financed firms in service sectors is not the focus, and
will not be discussed in this paper.
In PORTER'S (1998:127) seminal book, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, he argues that the competitive advantage of a nation is determined by four interactive factors: (1) firm strategy, structure and rivalry, (2) factor conditions, (3) demand conditions and (4) related and supporting industries. He applies this paradigm to explain the development of four national industries, e.g.
the German printing press industry, the American patient monitoring equipment industry, the Italian ceramic tile industry and the Japanese robotics industry.
Despite the usefulness of Porter's competitive advantage paradigm, it is not fully applicable in this paper due to the unique nature and the implications of WTO accession for the transitional economy in China. For instance, the ownership of a manufacturing firm is not considered explicitly in Porter's paradigm, yet it has profound implications for its taxation status in China (see below). Obviously, a new analytical framework is required to analyse the changing competitiveness of foreign-financed manufacturing firms and its implications for the development of Guangdong.
In contrast to the conventional dichotomised approach that classifies firms in China as foreign-financed and state-owned, this paper uses a multi-faceted and dynamic approach to analyse the impacts of WTO accession and government policies on the changing competitiveness of different categories of foreignfinanced firms in Guangdong (Figure 1 ). Apart from government policies, it is argued that a firm's competitive advantage is determined by four interactive parameters in China:
• Size: The size of a firm (e.g. large, small, etc.), which determines its production capacities (economies of scale) and capabilities (economies of scope).
• Sector: The industrial sector of a firm (e.g. textile and clothing, automobile, etc.), which determines the extent it is affected by the WTO accession treaties.
• Ownership: The origin of the firm's capital (e.g. US-financed, overseas
Chinese-financed, state-owned, locally-funded, etc.), which determines its taxation status in China.
• Investment: Firm with investment / manufacturing bases in China versus those without, which in turn determines the extent to which it is affected by WTO accession treaties.
[f] Figure 1 here
The four parameters -size, sector, ownership and investment -are interacting and react to the dynamic economic and political environment inside and outside China (Figure 1 Before analysing the effects of the WTO accession treaties and the (new)
Chinese government policies enforced ahead of accession on the competitiveness of foreign-financed firms in section 4, a brief introduction to the economy of Guangdong and a brief summary of the WTO accession agreement are presented in sections 2 and 3 respectively. The conclusions and the policy implications of the development of private entrepreneurship and the SOEs reform for the regional development of southern China will be discussed briefly in section 5. China will reduce the tariffs on automobile and automobile parts from the current 80-100% to 25% and 10% by 2006 respectively.
BACKGROUND OF GUANGDONG

• Elimination of import quotas and licences:
China will eliminate existing quotas upon accession for the US priority products, e.g. fibre optic cable.
Quotas and other quantitative restrictions will increase from the current trade level at 15% per annum and be phased-out no later than 2005.
• Import and distribution rights:
Foreign-financed firms (including WFVs) will have comprehensive trading (import and export) and distribution rights (wholesaling, retailing, transportation, etc., including the provision of services and goods made in China) in China for the first time.
Trading and distribution rights will be phased in progressively over three years.
• SOEs:
China will ensure that the sales and purchases of SOEs and state-invested enterprises (SIEs) are based solely on commercial considerations, such as price, quality and marketability, rather than 'government procurement'.
The SOEs and SIEs are regulated under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures, e.g. no export subsidies.
• Textiles:
The deal incorporates an existing Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) signed in 1995, under which the Multilateral Fibre Agreement restrictions (export quotas to the US) will be phased out in 2005.
The US special safeguard mechanism to prevent a surge of imports of textile and clothing products will be phased out in 2008.
The US maintains its current anti-dumping methodology (treating China as a non-market economy) in future anti-dumping cases for 15 years after Chinese accession.
WTO ACCESSION: LEVELLING THE PLAYING FIELD?
Apart from the direct effects of the accession treaties, the newly enforced Chinese policies also have important implications for the competitiveness of foreignfinanced firms. As mentioned previously, the analysis of the competitive advantages of foreign-financed firms in southern China is based on four interactive parameters: size, sector, ownership and investment ( Figure 1 ).
The effects of WTO accession on foreign-financed firms
Contrary to the general perception, foreign firms that have invested in southern China before WTO accession do not necessarily enjoy 'first mover' advantages, mainly due to the reduction of tariffs, elimination of export quotas and the opening up of distribution channels.
In the textile and clothing industry, the ability to use Hong Kong export quotas is one of the greatest competitive advantages of foreign-financed firms located in Guangdong. The majority of foreign-financed textile and clothing firms Rather than enjoying 'first mover' advantages, the reduction of import tariffs on raw materials, the elimination of export quotas and the opening up of distribution channels may actually deprive foreign-financed firms with investment in southern China of some of the competitive advantages may used to enjoy.
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This is especially the case for the textiles and clothing industry where the ability 13 to use Hong Kong quotas is one of the greatest competitive advantages of foreignfinanced firms in Guangdong. It must however be emphasised that this argument is sector-specific and circumstance-or individual case-specific. Foreign-financed firms in Guangdong have to apply every six months for a production contact from the Chinese Customs to import raw materials free of tariffs into China (Table 1) . To counter bureaucratic red-tape, a number of foreign-financed firms in Guangdong are either sharing their production contracts to have the right to import tariff-free raw materials, or are smuggling some of their raw materials into China without the proper documentation. To ensure that a cargo is not impounded in the Shenzhen-Hong Kong border zone, foreign-financed firms in Guangdong normally pay-off Chinese Customs inspectors to cover up their illegitimate activities. In some cases, the under-reporting of the amount and/or value of imported raw materials can be purely unintentional, i.e. a careless mistake by the people who fill in the customs documentation. As the timely delivery of the cargo is essential, and as it is too time-consuming to negotiate with (Field survey, 2000) . The strict enforcement of regulations on production contracts is equivalent to removing the 'first-mover' competitive advantage of foreign-financed firms in Guangdong. This is because the production contract strictly defines the quantity and variety of raw materials that the firm is allowed to import tariff-free in every six-month period.
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Obviously, this inflexibility does not facilitate rapid adaptations to market demand, as the firm is unable to increase production to meet an unexpectedly large order at short notice from its customers or to introduce new products which demand raw materials not specified in the production contract. The rigidity of the production contract has far-reaching consequences for the competitive advantages of SMEs in Guangdong, especially those engaging in sub-contracting businesses where the flexibility to change the production lines to adapt to the seasonality of markets and to sell new products are vital for their success.
To prevent tax evasion, and the illegal re-selling of tariff-free raw materials imported by foreign-financed firms in southern China, the State Bureau of Foreign Exchange cooperates with the Customs to implement strictly the verification rules on imports and exports (hexiao) ( Table 1) . Foreign-financed firms in Guangdong have to submit their production contracts with export documents to the Chinese Customs to verify that its imported tariff-free raw (Table 1) . 15 It is also not easy for Customs inspectors to decide which cargo is deliberately under-or over-reported in import or export documents.
As a transparent legal channel for arbitration on the legality of import and export activities does not exist, the general practice for Customs inspectors is to refer suspected cases to the Inspection Department if they find minor irregularities between the cargo and the documents. By doing so, the Chinese Customs inspectors avoid the pitfall of being accused of being lenient towards a particular firm and of raising suspicions of corruption. To 'scare off the monkey by killing the chicken' (shaji xiahou), they can also send an unambiguous signal to other foreign investors in Guangdong that they can no longer bribe their way out. Once the cargo is impounded, however, it takes at least 2-3 days for the investigation, and the company involved may miss the shipment date (Field survey, 1996-97, 2000).
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To simplify the administrative duties and regulate transfer pricing by Guangdong have to pay a deposit equal to about 30% of the value of imported raw materials to guarantee that all of its finished products are for export (Table 1) .
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The Chinese Customs inspectors have the authority to confiscate the deposit if the firm does not verify its production contract with export documents within three months of the import of raw materials. Moreover, foreign-financed firms in
Guangdong also have to appoint designated auditors to prepare daily records of import/export for the Customs. Due to the loopholes and the difficulties of enforcing existing Chinese laws which regulate FDI, it is not uncommon for a locally-funded enterprise or a SOE in southern China to channel capital through its overseas subsidiaries to invest in the 'FDI of Chinese origin' firm. 21 The overseas subsidiary can either be a second-tier ('spin-off') company or a 'shell' company taken over by the core enterprise based in southern China. The overseas 'shell' company can be a socalled 'briefcase company' where the 'nominal owner' is the emigrant relative or friend of the 'real owner' of the core enterprise, who contributes most of the investment. As the source of the investment capital can be 'questionable', deriving, for example, from illegal gains from corruption and/or asset stripping of SOEs, the operation of such a company is secret. 22 The overseas 'shell' company can also be an overseas listed company taken over by the core enterprise in southern China.
Apart from being used as a vehicle to raise capital overseas, the 'shell' company 
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The WTO accession of China may level the playing field between largescale foreign-financed firms in southern China and TNCs seeking to enter the Chinese market through direct import. However, the evidence presented above does not suggest that WTO accession will bring about parity between foreignfinanced and foreign-financed firms of 'Chinese origin' in southern China. This is partly because the central government implements some policies to tilt the playing field against foreign-financed SMEs in southern China, and partly because a number of local governments in Guangdong have implemented various policies to favour locally-funded firms and 'FDI of Chinese origin' firms.
CONCLUSIONS & POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The analysis of empirical evidence using the multi-faceted and dynamic approach adopted in this paper suggests that the playing field for manufacturing firms in southern China is far from level under the new competitive landscape created as China prepares for WTO accession. The process of industrial consolidation in manufacturing sectors will be accelerated in Guangdong. On the one hand, it is argued that TNCs and some competitive large-scale locally-funded (including 'FDI of Chinese origin') firms in Guangdong will 'win' after WTO accession (Table 2) [t] Table 2 here [/t]
On the other hand, the crowding-out process of foreign-financed SMEs in
Guangdong will be accelerated in the near future for three main reasons (Table 2) . Undeniably, the competitiveness and vitality of foreign-financed and privatelyfunded enterprises have had and will have profound long-term effects on the economic development of Guangdong, before and after the WTO accession.
Therefore, policy makers in Guangdong and Beijing should not only pay attention to the direct 'knock-on effect' of WTO accession on China, but also to the 'domino effect' of WTO accession on the competitiveness of foreign-financed firms as well as the positive impacts of SMEs, both foreign-financed and MACBEAN (1996) . 5 As the consumer price index is only available from 1984 onwards, the retail price index-based GDP deflator is used to estimate the real GDP in Guangdong. 6 It is estimated that the number of migrants working and living in Guangdong accounts for onethird to one-half of its local population of 72.99 million. The official statistics only report the local population.
7 As the economy developed, the share of export value channelled through the Guangdong's Commission of Foreign Economic Relation and Trade in the total export value in Guangdong (the Customs' figures) diminished from 75% in 1990 to 45% in 1998 (GBS, 1999:501). . 13 To determine the validity of the production contact, the Chinese Customs inspectors come to the firm to evaluate the production processes, e.g. do the firm really need x amount of raw materials to produce y amount of good or are they trying to import more tariff-free raw materials than required and then re-sell them for profits? selected economic zones. In fact, the government may extend the preferential tax rate to all foreign-financed firms in China (SCMP, 2000d). 26 Being a 'FDI of Chinese origin' firm, the biggest winner of the complex inter-locking shareownership game is/are the 'real owner(s)' of company B. Apart from various forms of preferential taxation privilege granted to FDI, the 'real' owners of company B also enjoy a much lower income tax rate in Hong Kong, e.g. a maximum of 16% in Hong Kong versus the 40% or higher in China.
Moreover, the dividend payable to shareholders of company B can be easily converted into foreign currencies through a trading company, i.e. to use the dividend to purchase a shipment of other goods and then export it overseas. As the annual rate of return of equity joint venture shareholders ranged from 10-30% per annum, the 'routing' of capital via Hong Kong and the converting of it into foreign currencies not only saves the 'real' owner(s) of company B up to one million of yuan per annum in profit and income tax, but also acts as a safeguard for the dividend as may can, for example, deposit them in a Swiss bank account, etc. 27 In 1999, China accounted for only 0.5% of the global merger and acquisition activities in value term. But the average annual growth rate of mergers and acquisitions in China was a staggering 89% between 1990-1999, so there is plenty of 'virgin land' to be explored (MSDW, 2000:10) . 28 In fact, the development of privately-funded firms is partly due to the demonstration effects of foreign-financed firms in southern China. 29 For instance, a small-scale Hong Kong-funded jean laundry processing and assembling firm in Guangdong was almost bankrupted during the Asia financial crisis when a number of its customers became insolvent and failed to pay up more than two million yuan of processing and assembling fees (Field survey, 2000) . It is very difficult to estimate accurately the impact of the Asian financial crisis on foreign-financed and privately-funded SMEs in southern China as local governments regarded this information as 'sensitive and confidential'. However, the number of firms registered in Guangdong can be used as an indirect benchmark. In 1997, there were 59,040
foreign-financed firms -of which 374 were registered as (large-scale) 'major foreign-financed firms' -registered in Guangdong (GBS, 1998:507-509). In 1998, the total number of foreignfinanced firms registered in Guangdong decreased to 57,665 while the number of 'major foreignfinanced firms' almost doubled to 676 (GBS, 1999:526-528). The total number of industrial enterprises (including locally-and privately-funded firms) registered in Guangdong decreased 33 even more dramatically. For instance, the total number of industrial enterprises in Guangzhou decreased from 7,528 to 2,830 while the real gross value of industrial output increased from 138 billion yuan in 1997 to 184 billion in 1998, respectively (GBS, 1999:331). The above evidence suggests that a large number of foreign-financed and privately-funded SMEs have either closed or closed and moved elsewhere during the Asian financial crisis. 30 Apart from the recent 50% reduction in the import-deposit imposed on foreign-financed SMEs by the Guangdong government, the establishment of 15 special Economic and Technological Development Zones (one of them is in Guangzhou) reserved for export-processing industries, and in which businesses are exempted from import-deposits may be a first-step in the right direction in addressing the capital constraints experienced by SMEs (SCMP, 1999d (SCMP, , 2000b (SCMP, , 2000c ).
